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When Is a Partner Not a Partner? Wheeler v.
Main Hurdman 1 and Caruso v. Peat, Marwick,
Mitchell & Co.2
Dan Hammond*
A working man was discharged from his job. Believing he
had been fired from his job because of his age, he filed a discrimi-
nation suit against his employer. A working woman, believing she
was dismissed for unlawful reasons of sex and age, also filed suit
against her former employer. The two situations are similar in
other respects. Both of the employers engaged in the same busi-
ness and had thousands of workers in over seventy cities across the
country. The man and woman had the same job titles and per-
formed similar functions.
The results of the suits, however, differed greatly. In the
man's case, Caruso v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. ,3 the United
States District court said that workers such as Conrad Caruso are
protected by the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA)
and therefore have a cause of action under the Act to remedy dis-
criminatory conduct of their employers.4 The woman did not fare
as well. In Wheeler v. Main Hurdman5 the Tenth Circuit dis-
missed Marilyn Wheeler's discrimination claim, holding that work-
ers of her type are not covered by any of the federal
Antidiscrimination Acts protecting "employees." 6
What was the reason for the differing treatment? Caruso and
* B.A., B.S., University of Minnesota (1983); J.D., University of Minnesota
(1989).
1. 825 F.2d 257 (10th Cir. 1987).
2. 664 F. Supp. 144 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
3. Id.
4. Id. at 150. The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA) is
codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). See Section II(A) infra for
discussion of the coverage of the ADEA.
5. 825 F.2d 257 (10th Cir. 1987).
6. Id. at 277. Marilyn Wheeler claimed her dismissal violated Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1982); the
ADEA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986); and the Equal Pay Act of 1963,
29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1982), a subpart of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938
(FLSA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). Id. at 258. For convenience
these statutes will be referred to as the Antidiscrimination Acts or Acts. See Sec-
tion II(A) infra for further discussion of the Antidiscrimination Acts.
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Wheeler were both partners in accounting firms. They had simi-
lar responsibilities and duties. Why should the law deny them
similar remedies? The outright dismissal of Ms. Wheeler's claim
is a result of a continuing failure of the courts to determine
whether partners are covered by federal antidiscrimination laws
on a case by case basis. When the economic reality of the work re-
lationship is analyzed properly, a low-level partner in a large, na-
tion-wide partnership of essentially perpetual duration quite
frequently looks like an employee in a corporation.7 The Caruso
court made this analogy in extending such a partner the protection
of the federal Antidiscrimination Acts.
The Antidiscrimination Acts have been very effective in pro-
moting the entrance and advancement of women and minorities
into large sectors of the workforce. The advancement of women
and minorities to the rank of partner, however, has been slow.8 As
a result, the issue whether partners are protected from discrimina-
tion under the Acts did not present itself until recently. The
Wheeler decision allows many of the professions organized as part-
nerships--doctors, attorneys, architects-to discriminate against
partners at will, notwithstanding federal antidiscrimination laws.
The Antidiscrimination Acts have opened the front door of
partnerships to women and minorities; the Supreme Court has
held that the advancement of an employee to partner is covered
by the Acts.9 The legality of partnerships then quietly showing
partners out the back door once they are designated as such must
not rest on a narrow judicial interpretation of "employee" for pur-
poses of the Acts. If partners are categorically excluded from the
definition of "employee," the result will be the inability of the
Acts to prevent discrimination in many of the most prized and
respected professions.
Comparison of the Wheeler and Caruso decisions demon-
strates partners' need for discrimination protection and the error
of the Wheeler court's broad denial of such protection. The work
relationships from which the two plaintiffs found themselves so
rudely evicted were far more similar than different, making a com-
parison of the two cases appropriate. Each firm was a large, na-
7. See infra note 47 and accompanying text.
8. See, e.g., Still a Long Way to Go For Women, Minorities, Nat'1 L.J., Feb. 8,
1988, p. 1. Over 90% of the partners in the law firms surveyed by the National Law
Journal were white males. In this survey of 19,610 partners, less than eight percent
were women, only .81% were black, and combined numbers of Asian and Hispanic
partners were less than one percent.
9. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69 (1984).
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tion-wide accounting firm;'( Main Hurdman had 502 partners,"
Peat, Marwick & Mitchell had over 1350 partners.' 2 Each firm
was managed by a hierarchical structure of managing partners;' 3
neither plaintiff was a member of the management structure.14
Each had been employed by their firm for roughly ten years
before promotion to partner.15 Their work duties remained essen-
tially the same after the supposed change in status from employee
to partner.16 Their wages varied little with profits.17 The sole rel-
evant difference was ownership interest: Mr. Caruso had none in
his firm's while Ms. Wheeler owned a minute share in Main
Hurdman.19
The first section of this article discusses the coverage of the
Antidiscrimination Acts, focussing on the definition of "employee"
in the statutes and its case law definition under the "economic re-
alities" test. The courts have developed the "economic realities"
test to determine if relationships not fitting the historical label of
"employee," but functionally similar are covered by the Acts. The
second section analyzes the concept of partnership, particularly
those aspects of a large partnership that can be more indicative of
an "employment" relationship than that of a partner status. The
third section discusses the facts and conflicting holdings of the two
cases. The conclusion of the article advocates a case by case ap-
10. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell had over one hundred domestic offices. Caruso v.
Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 664 F. Supp. 144, 145 (S.D.N.Y. 1987). Main
Hurdman had over eighty. Wheeler v. Main Hurdman, 825 F.2d 257, 261 (10th Cir.
1987).
11. Wheeler, 825 F.2d at 260.
12. Caruso, 664 F. Supp. at 145.
13. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell was run by a board of directors. Under the board
was a six-tier management structure ranging from the Chief Executive Officer to
the Partners in Charge at each office. These management positions contained 300
of the firm's 1350 partners. Id.
Main Hurdman was managed by a Managing Partner/Chief Executive Officer,
a National Policy Board, and a National Nominating Committee. All partners
could vote but only on ratification of the decisions of these three managing groups.
Each office had a managing partner residing over department heads. Ms. Wheeler
was supervised by the same partner prior and successive to her becoming a "part-
ner." Wheeler, 825 F.2d at 261.
14. Caruso, 664 F. Supp. at 145; Wheeler, 825 F.2d at 261.
15. Caruso, 664 F. Supp. at 145; Wheeler, 825 F.2d at 258.
16. Caruso, 664 F. Supp. at 145; Wheeler, 825 F.2d at 261.
17. Mr. Caruso had a base salary which could be slightly incremented by prof-
its. But the increments were based on a point system through which management
assigned ratings to Mr. Caruso. His point accrual was minimal. Caruso, 664 F. Supp.
at 146.
Ms. Wheeler's wages were established by management. Wheeler, 825 F.2d at
261.
18. Caruso, 664 F. Supp. at 146.
19. Ms. Wheeler's initial contribution of $4,000 amounted to a .000058 share of
the firm. Wheeler, 825 F.2d at 262.
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proach to determining the reality of the "partnership" working re-
lationship so that partners such as Marilyn Wheeler and Conrad
Caruso receive the protections of the Antidiscrimination Acts. By
agreeing with and expanding on the reasoning of the Caruso deci-
sion, it demonstrates the error of the Wheeler opinion and the
need for "partner protection."
I. Coverage of the Acts
Three federal acts-Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
(Title VII),20 the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(ADEA),21 and the Equal Pay Act of 1963, a subpart of the Fair
Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA)22--prohibit a broad range of
discriminatory practices in the work place. Title VII provides:
(a) .. .It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an em-
ployer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individ-
ual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with
respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or ap-
plicants for employment in any way which would deprive or
tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or
otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because
of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin.23
The language of the ADEA is nearly identical except that it
expressly prohibits discriminatory practices based on age.24 The
Equal Pay Act of the FLSA prohibits wage discrimination based
on sex.
25
20. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1982).
21. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
22. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
23. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).
24. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) provides:
(a) .. .It shall be unlawful for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or other-
wise discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensa-
tion, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual's age;
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any way which
would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment oppor-
tunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, be-
cause of such individual's age; or
(3) to reduce the wage rate of any employee in order to comply with
this Act.
25. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) provides:
No employer having employees subject to any provisions of this sec-
tion shall discriminate, within any establishment in which such em-
[Vol. 6:231
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A. Definition of "Employee" Under the
Antidiscrimination Acts
Analysis of the applicability of the Acts to partners may pro-
ceed only after the broad language and its broad interpretation is
noted. Congress, in enacting and amending the Acts, used open-
ended definitions and terminology to carry out its purpose: the
eradication of discrimination. The courts, in interpreting the Acts,
are explicitly aware of, and guided by, this purpose in reaching
their decisions.
The broad definition given the term employee is virtually
identical in all three Acts: an employee is an individual employed
by an employer.26 The circularity of the definition, although un-
helpful, would seem to indicate that Congress desired breadth in
the definition. It demonstrates that Congress purposefully avoided
a restrictive definition in order to extend the Acts' protections to
large segments of the workforce. 27 One court has broadly inter-
preted the Acts' coverage, saying, in effect, that if the work rela-
ployees are employed, between employees on the basis of sex by
paying wages to employees in such establishment at a rate less than
the rate at which he pays wages to employees of the opposite sex in
such establishment for equal work on jobs the performance of which
requires equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and which are per-
formed under similar working conditions....
26. 29 U.S.C. 203(e)(1)("...any individual employed by an employer."); 29
U.S.C. 630(f)("...an individual employed by any employer..."); 42 U.S.C.
2000e(f)(".. .an individual employed by an employer...").
27. See, e.g., Nancy E. Dowd, The Test of Employee Status: Economic Realities
and Title VII, 26 Win. & Mary L. Rev. 75, 89 (1984) ("Congress deliberately left the
term employee undefined, recognizing the difficulties of constructing a technical
definition that would include the broad range of employment relationships."); Ad-
dison v. Holly Hill Fruit Prods., Inc., 322 U.S. 607, 617 (1944) ("If legislative policy is
couched in vague language, easily susceptible of one meaning as well as another in
the common speech of men, we should not stifle a policy by a pedantic or grudging
process of construction.").
It should also be noted that while there are explicit exceptions in the coverage
of the Acts, there is no explicit exception for professional associations. Note, Ten-
ure and Partnership as Title VII Remedies, 94 Harv. L. Rev. 457, 460 (1980). See
also EEOC v. Rinella & Rinella, 401 F. Supp. 175, 180 (N.D. Ill. 1975) ("since the
primary objective of Title VII is the elimination of the major social ills of job dis-
crimination, discriminatory practices in professional fields are not immune from at-
tack").
Furthermore, legislative history indicates explicit intentions to cover profes-
sionals. H.R. Rep. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 28 (1963) (representatives'
views that Title VII should apply to engineers, scientists, lawyers, doctors, and
teachers); 118 Cong. Rec. 3801-02 (1972) (Sen. Javits' opposition to amendment ex-
empting hospital-employed physicians from Title VII coverage). Sen. Javits said:
[O]ne of the things that those discriminated against have resented the
most is that they are relegated to the position of the sawers of wood
and drawers of water; that only blue-collar jobs and ditchdigging jobs
are reserved for them; and that. . .they cannot ascend the higher rungs
in professional and other life.
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tionship is such that the worker is in a position subject to
discrimination and the Acts are appropriate to remedy that dis-
crimnation, then that worker is an employee.28
Mere designation of a worker as a "partner" does not place
that individual outside the protections of the Acts.2 9 The label is
not determinative. The actuality of the work relationship deter-
mines true "employee" status.30 In analyzing that actuality, the
Supreme Court has stated that the broad inclusiveness of Title VII
must not be restricted by lower court "interpretations of Title VII
that deprive victims of discrimination of a remedy, without clear
congressional mandate." 3' The term "employee" is to be "under-
stood with reference to the purpose of the Act.... "32
Both the Wheeler and Caruso courts began at this starting
point-broad legislative language, broad precedential interpreta-
tion-but the Wheeler court failed to keep the goal of the Acts in
mind when it reached the next step of analysis: the economic reali-
ties test.
B. The Economic Realities Test
Given the freedom to broadly construe the Acts, the courts
have adopted a test to discern employee status and therefore the
coverage of the Antidiscrimination Acts. Title VII, the ADEA, and
the FLSA are federal acts designed to eradicate discrimination in
the economy. The definition given to "employee" is critical to the
coverage of the Acts.
The courts developed the "economic realities" test to extend
protection of the Acts to those work relationships not fitting tradi-
tional definitions of "employee." The word employee has a long
history of common law definition, but the Supreme Court has re-
jected that common law definition in "federal legislation, adminis-
tered by a national agency, intended to solve a national problem on
28. NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 129 (1944). See also Note,
Applicability of Federal Antidiscrimination Legislation to the Selection of a Law
Partner, 76 Mich. L. Rev. 282, 290 (1977); Arthur J. Paone & Robert Ira Reis, Effec-
tive Enforcement of Federal Nondiscrimination Provisions in the Hiring of Law-
yers, 40 S. Cal. L. Rev. 615, 633 (1967).
29. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 79 n.2 (1984) (Powell, J.,
concurring).
30. Carter v. Dutchess Community College, 735 F.2d 8, 13 (2d Cir. 1984); Arm-
bruster v. Quinn, 711 F.2d 1332, 1340 (6th Cir. 1983); Zimmerman v. N. Am. Signal
Co., 704 F.2d 347, 352 (7th Cir. 1983); EEOC v. First Catholic Ladies Slovak Ass'n,
694 F.2d 1068, 1070 (6th Cir. 1982); Unger v. Consol. Foods Corp., 657 F.2d 909, 916
(6th Cir. 1981).
31. County of Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 178 (1981).
32. Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722, 729 (1947) (FLSA).
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WHEN IS A PARTNER NOT A PARTNER?
a national scale." 3 3
In NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc.,34 the Supreme Court
first used an analysis of the working relationship that was later
designated the "economic realities" test. The Court upheld the
NLRB's finding that men who sold papers on the street were em-
ployees of the newspaper rather than independent contractors and
were therefore covered by the National Labor Relations Act.35
The test the Court used looked to the "economic facts of the
[work] relation" to determine when these "characteristics may out-
weigh technical legal classification for purposes unrelated to the
statute's objectives and bring the relation within its protections.
Congress recognized that these economic relationships cannot be
neatly fitted into a definition of 'employee' that earlier law had
shaped for a different purpose." 36  The Court concluded that the
term employee is to be defined with reference to the purpose of
the Act and the economic relationship involved.37 Furthermore,
the fact that the worker in question has been subjected to discrimi-
nation that the Act was designed to prevent, is a relevant consider-
ation in finding that he or she is an "employee." 39
With the purpose of the Acts in mind, the work relationship
may then be analyzed. Factors critical to the employment relation
are: the employer's degree of control, the method of compensa-
tion, the method of hiring and firing, the degree of investment by
the individual in the business, and the liability of the individual to
the business. 39 Yet, "[c]onsideration of all of the circumstances
33. NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 123 (1944). Common law
definitions of employee-employer status are not binding in construing federal em-
ployment statutes. Walling v. Portland Terminal Co., 330 U.S. 148, 152-53 (1947);
NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 123 (1944); Armbruster v. Quinn,
711 F.2d 1332, 1340 (6th Cir. 1983); Calderon v. Martin County, 639 F.2d 271, 272-73
(5th Cir. 1981); Clarkson Constr. Co. v. OSHA, 531 F.2d 451, 457-58 (10th Cir. 1976).
See also Dowd, supra note 27, at 86 ("The fundamental injustice resulting from the
use of the common law test of employee status in Title VII cases is that the test
fails to consider the employee's perspective of the relationship and the employer's
ability to manipulate access to employment opportunities and to control the terms
and conditions of employment.").
34. 322 U.S. 111 (1944).
35. Id. at 131-32.
36. Id. at 128. The Court went on to say:
[T]he broad language of the Act's definitions, which in terms reject
conventional limitations on such conceptions as "employee," "em-
ployer," and "labor dispute," leaves no doubt that its applicability is to
be determined broadly, in doubtful situations, by underlying economic
facts rather than technically and exclusively by previously established
legal classifications.
Id. at 129.
37. Id. at 129.
38. Id. at 127.
39. Spirides v. Reinhardt, 613 F.2d 826, 831-32 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
1988]
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surrounding the work relationship is essential, and no one factor is
determinative." 40 It is the substance of the working relationship
that is critical, not the label applied to its form.
In addition, it is critical to note that when Congress has dis-
agreed with judicial definitions of "employee" that use the eco-
nomic realities test, it has expressly amended the Acts to use the
common law definition of "employee."41 There was no such
amendment to the FLSA following the Hearst Court's economic
realities definition. Subsequent determinations of employee status
under the FLSA have used the economic realities test.42 Further-
more, judicial definitions construing one Antidiscrimination Act
are "persuasive authority when interpreting the others."43 Many
courts interpreting the ADEA and Title VII have applied the eco-
nomic realities test in discerning the true working relationship.44
The following section describes the nature of partnership and
shows that application of the Acts to partners in certain circum-
stances is consistent with and does not overly intrude upon the
concept of partnership.
II. The Nature of Partnership
One basic argument against allowing a partner to sue the
partnership is that a partnership is an aggregate made up of the
individual partners leaving no separate entity which may be
sued.4 5 Under this theory, a partner in essence would be suing
himself. The history and judicial developmentoof partnership law,
however, demonstrate that partnership law contains aspects of
both the aggregate and entity theories. In fact, the first two drafts
of the Act to Make Uniform the Law of Partnership in 1902 con-
40. Id. at 831. See also Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722, 730
(1947)(the test should not focus on "isolated factors" of the work relationship).
41. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 410(j)(2) (1982) (Social Security Act).
42. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Whitaker House Coop., 366 U.S. 28 (1961); Donovan v.
DialAmerica Mktg., Inc., 757 F.2d 1376 (3d Cir. 1985); Carter v. Dutchess Commu-
nity College, 735 F.2d 8 (2d Cir. 1984); Doty v. Elias, 733 F.2d 720 (10th Cir. 1984);
Dunlop v. Carriage Carpet Co., 548 F.2d 139 (6th Cir. 1977).
43. Hyland v. New Haven Radiology Assoc., P.C., 794 F.2d 793, 796 (2d Cir.
1986).
44. See, e.g., Garrett v. Phillips Mills, Inc., 721 F.2d 979, 981 (4th Cir. 1983)(ap-
plication of the economic realities test to determine coverage of the ADEA); EEOC
v. Zippo Mfg. Co., 713 F.2d 32, 37-38 (3d Cir. 1983)(test applied to ADEA coverage
determination); Armbruster v. Quinn, 711 F.2d 1332, 1341-42 (6th Cir. 1983)(test ap-
plied to Title VII coverage determination); Unger v. Consol. Foods Corp., 657 F.2d
909, 915 n.8 (7th Cir. 1981)(test applied to Title VII coverage determination); Spi-
rides v. Reinhardt, 613 F.2d 826, 831 (D.C. Cir. 1979)(test applied to Title VII cover-
age determination).
45. A. Ladru Jensen, Is a Partnership Under the Uniform Partnership Act an
Aggregate or an Entity?, 16 Vand. L. Rev. 377, 384-85 (1963).
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tained a single definition describing a partnership as a legal person
or an entity.46 The final draft of the Uniform Partnership Act
(UPA), adopted in 1914, showed the results of the compromise be-
tween the competing theories reached at the 1914 National Confer-
ence of Commissioners on Uniform Laws.47 Although the UPA
contains an "aggregate" definition of partnership,48 it contains
nineteen sections that refer to the entity concept of partnership.4 9
Because of this dual characterization, it would not be an in-
herent violation of traditional partnership law to treat the partner-
ship as an entity and its partners as employees in certain
circumstances. One commentator has argued that treatment of
partnership as an entity should depend on the particular question
before the court.50 Courts and legislatures have often done so for
tax purposes5 1 and for worker's compensation statutes.52 Two of
the leading authorities on partnership, Crane and Bromberg, also
support this position:
There is no doubt of the ability of legislatures to treat partner-
ships as entities. They have often done so, either by specific
mention of partnerships in operative provisions, as in the
Bankruptcy Act or in authorizations for suit in the firm name,
or by defining operative words like "person" or "whoever" to
include partnerships along with other persons and
organizations.5 3
Crane and Bromberg make a statement particularly relevant
to the work relationships in partnerships with many partners: "no
corporation is more entity-like than a large law or accounting firm
which has been going for generations, often under the name of
someone long since dead, with dozens or hundreds of partners (of
whom only a handful, as managing partners or an executive com-
mittee, make major decisions)...."54
As these firms become more like corporations, they maintain
46. Id. at 377.
47. Id. at 378-79.
48. "A partnership is an association of two or more persons to carry on as co-
owners a business for profit." U.P.A. § 6(1) (1914).
49. U.P.A. §§ 2, 8, 9, 10, 12, 13, 14, 15, 18, 19, 21, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 30, 35, 40 (1914).
50. Jensen, supra note 45, at 384.
51. See, e.g., Armstrong v. Phinney, 394 F.2d 661 (5th Cir. 1968); Temp. Treas.
Reg. § 1.274-6T(e)(2)(ii,iii) (1985).
52. See, e.g., Trappey v. Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co., 229 La. 632, 86 So. 2d 515
(1956); Ohio Drilling Co. v. State Indus. Comm'n, 86 Okla. 139, 207 P. 314 (1922);
Cal. Lab. Code § 3351(f) (West 1971); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 418.161 (West Supp.
1977); Ore. Rev. Stat. § 656.128 (1965); 85 Okla. Stat. Ann. § 3 (West Supp. 1977);
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-43(4) (1953); Wash. Rev. Code § 51.32.030 (1977).
53. Alan R. Bromberg, Crane and Bromberg on Partnership § 3, at 25 (1969)
(footnotes omitted).
54. Id. at 19-20.
1988]
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many of the benefits of the partnership form. Evading the scope
of antidiscrimination laws should not be one of these benefits. In-
deed, if the Wheeler court interpretation is used to broadly ex-
empt partners from the Acts' protections, then the fortuity of a
firm's choice of business organization could determine if a partner
has a claim. For instance, if a law firm is organized as a profes-
sional corporation rather than as a partnership, the partner's coun-
terpart is characterized as an employee and is protected by the
Acts.5 5 The two positions, while analogous, thus would receive dif-
fering treatment under the law of W/heeler.
Questions of partnership law should not be solved by an as-
sumption of which theory-aggregate or entity-prevails. Since as-
pects of both are injected into partnership law, "[a] pragmatic
approach to the controversy is to reject either theory and simply to
solve problems of partnership law as they arise, with the solution
being dictated not by legal formalism, but by the merits of particu-
lar solutions."5
A partner's ability to control and manage the partnership is
a critical indication of partnership status. According to the Uni-
form Partnership Act, every partner acting as an authorized agent
of the partnership has the power to bind the partnership.5 7 Part-
ners also share in profits and are personally liable for losses,58 and
each partner takes part in running the partnership business.59 Be-
cause of these attributes of co-management and co-ownership, the
partnership was traditionally viewed as a more personal relation-
ship than other business forms. The UPA was drafted nearly a
century ago; the large nationwide organizations called partnerships
today are certainly not the personal business relationships origi-
nally envisioned by the drafters. In fact, co-management of the
business, one of the critical, original indications of partnership, is
an attribute most likely to disappear in the bureaucracy of a large
partnership. This fact was demonstrated by Mr. Caruso's and Ms.
Wheeler's lack of participation in the management of their firms.60
The next section discusses the Wheeler and Caruso courts'
reasoning behind their applications of the economic realities test to
partners.
55. Note, Tenure and Partnership as Title VII Remedies, 94 Harv. L. Rev. 457,
462-63 (1980).
56. Harold Gill Reuschlein & William A. Gregory, Handbook on the Law of
Agency and Partnership 263 (1979).
57. U.P.A. § 9.
58. Id. §§ 7, 15.
59. Id. §§ 6, 9, 24.
60. See supra note 13.
[Vol. 6:231
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III. The Economic Realities Analysis of the Caruso and Wheeler
Courts
A. Caruso
The Caruso court looked at three factors "traditionally associ-
ated with an individual's status as a partner... "61 While the court
never explicitly referred to the economic realities test, the three
factors coincide with those often used in the economic realities
test: the partner's ability to control and operate the business; the
method of compensation; and the permanence of the work
relationship.6 2
Concerning the control factor, the court pointed out that the
unilateral control of a partner by another member of the business
is more like an employment relationship than that of a partner; a
true partner should have a "joint right of control over the busi-
ness. ... 63 Focussing on the plaintiff's lack of decision discretion
and need for management approval of the few decisions he could
make, the court found his position was more characteristic of an
employee than of a partner.6 4 As for the wage factor, the court
pointed out that although there was a lack of evidence showing ex-
act wages, plaintiff's small "unit" accumulation indicated that his
salary varied little with profits.65 The court stated that a partner's
compensation is typically a percentage of firm profits rather than a
fixed wage or salary.6 6 Finally, plaintiff's permanence of employ-
ment depended on his meeting standards set out in regular job
evaluations by other partners. The court said these performance
standards were not indicative of a partner who was a permanent
member of the firm.6 7
The court found that Caruso's status was more like that of an
employee than a partner and held that the plaintiff was protected
by the ADEA and could sue under the Act.6 8
B. Wheeler
The Wheeler court began its analysis by asserting that there
was no common standard of the economic realities test that could
61. Caruso v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 664 F. Supp. 144, 148-49 (S.D.N.Y.
1987).
62. Id. at 149-50.
63. Id. at 149 (quoting Hayes v. Irwin, 541 F. Supp. 397, 415-16 (N.D. Ga. 1982)).







be used for partners. 69 The lower court had examined three fac-
tors: defendant's power to hire or fire, defendant's control of work
schedules and employment conditions, and defendant's power to
determine compensation. Judge Carrigan pointed out in the opin-
ion that even the plaintiff and the EEOC, who had joined the
plaintiff as amicus curae, were not in agreement as to the factors
determinative of the economic reality of the work relationship.70
The plaintiff and the EEOC agreed on the question to be asked-
"Economic reality to them translates into a condition of domina-
tion: Is the individual so dominated in or by the organization that
he or she is really like an employee, with corollary susceptibility to
discrimination?" 71 The EEOC argued for an economic realities
test that would look to all of the circumstances of the working re-
lationship but emphasized the employer's degree of control as
most important. 72 The plaintiff viewed the nature of the work and
the independence, or lack thereof, as the critical factors of the
test.73
The court recognized that application of the economic reali-
ties test was appropriate in determining the coverage of remedial
social legislation such as the Antidiscrimination Acts, but only in
the proper circumstances. 74 The court stated that the economic re-
alities test could be applied to partnerships, but rejected the ver-
sions put forth by Ms. Wheeler and the EEOC as incomplete.75
The court found two problems with the tests offered. First, since
the tests were developed for application to independent contractor
situations, they were not practical in application to partnerships. 76
Second, use of the domination factor would force every partner-
ship to prove that all partners were free of control and held some
sort of parity in the management process or all partnerships would
be subject to the Acts no matter how small.77 Hypothetically,
even in a small firm, one partner may dominate the others.78
Judge Carrigan considered other economic realities of partnership
status critical: liability for the partnership losses, the large size of
a partnership creating a tempting litigation target, profit sharing,
69. Wheeler v. Main Hurdman, 825 F.2d 257, 271 (10th Cir. 1987).
70. Id. at 269.
71. Id. at 268-69.
72. Id. at 269-70.
73. Id. at 269.
74. Id. at 271.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 271. The independent contractor determination involved drawing a
line between those persons who were really a part of the business (employees) and
those operating a separate business (independent contractors). Id. at 272.
77. Id. at 273.
78. Id.
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capital contribution, and the right to share in management.79
Finding these factors of critical relevance in the partnership con-
text, the court held that the analysis of these economic realities of
the work relationship demonstrated that Wheeler was not an em-
ployee for purposes of the Acts.
In deciding which of the factors of the economic realities test
to emphasize, the Wheeler and Caruso courts parted ways to reach
opposite results. While both courts applied three of the same fac-
tors-control, compensation, and hiring/firing power-the
Wheeler court felt compelled to give more weight to other factors,
such as the employee's investment in the firm and the liabilities of
the employee for partnership debts and tort settlements.
The next section shows that partners such as Mr. Caruso and
Ms. Wheeler are susceptible of categorization as "employees" and
that the Caruso court's analysis, ignoring or greatly discounting
factors that the Wheeler court seemed to think important, was
correct.
IV. Conclusion
The economic realities test is appropriately applied to part-
nerships. Although all factors should be considered, the Caruso
court was correct in its emphasis on the control factor. In the con-
text of large corporate-like partnerships, such as the accounting
firms in the Wheeler and Caruso cases, control is the most critical
factor relevant to the application of the Antidiscrimination Acts to
partners. The opportunity for discrimination against a person is
inversely related to their control in the business. The greater a
person's power to manage the more they are able to protect them-
selves from discrimination. When one has essentially no power in
the management of the business, as is the case for junior partners
in large accounting partnerships, then the protection of the federal
Antidiscrimination Acts is needed.
The ability of a partner to control the business in many large
partnerships is more like that of a shareholder in a corporation.
Both are allowed to vote, but usually only as a ratification of deci-
sions made by the managing group of the business. Interestingly, a
corporate shareholder's voting ability has not barred him or her
from also being considered an employee of the corporation.80
Other factors, such as the variation of partner wages accord-
79. Id. at 274.
80. See Hoy v. Progress Pattern Co., 217 F.2d 701, 704 (6th Cir. 1954) (a stock-
holder-officer-director relationship does not prevent such a person from being an
employee covered by Fair Labor Standards Act); Bonilla v. Oakland Scavenger Co.,
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ing to firm profits, individual investment in the firm, and individ-
ual liability for partnership obligations, have been so diluted with
the increasing size of partnerships that their importance must be
greatly discounted in the balance. One factor given too much
weight by the Wheeler court was the partner's investment in the
firm. Marilyn Wheeler owned a minute share of Main Hurdman.8 x
Although a traditional indication of partnership status, a partner's
investment should be considered only to the extent that the own-
ership interest is reflective of the partner's share of control in the
business. Minute capital shares in a partnership unaccompanied
by any right of control should not determine employee status. In
Goldberg v. Whitaker House Cooperative, Inc. ,82 members of a co-
operative who had ownership shares were designated employees
by the court due to the organization's control of the terms and con-
ditions of the members' work. Among other rights, the organiza-
tion retained the power to fire members.83 While an ownership
share in the partnership is another indication of partnership sta-
tus, "[t]here is nothing inherently inconsistent between the coexis-
tence of a proprietary and an employment relationship."8 4
As for the liability factor, the Wheeler court's fear that more
litigation against partnerships will result is not a valid reason for
disallowing discrimination suits against partnerships. The court
said that because partners are jointly and severally liable for part-
nership debts and settlements and because of the large amount of
capital in the firm, the partnership is a "tempting litigation tar-
get."8 5 If a firm is in a position to discriminate, the Acts should ap-
ply, regardless of the possibility of unwarranted lawsuits. Entities
are often the targets of unwarranted suits; courts have other meth-
ods available to screen and prevent such claims.8 6
A case by case approach to determining the economic reality
of the "partnership" working relationship is sufficient protection
for the integrity of the partnership. Under this approach not all
partners would be held to be employees but only those who met
the requirements of the test. Furthermore, such an approach
would further the purpose of the Antidiscrimination Acts. As one
author has pointed out, the definition of "employee" is critical to
697 F.2d 1297, 1302 (9th Cir. 1982) (discriminatory employment practices are within
reach of Title VII even though workers involved owned stock).
81. See supra note 19.
82. 366 U.S. 28 (1961).
83. Id. at 29.
84. Id. at 32.
85. Wheeler v. Main Hurdman, 825 F.2d 257, 274 (10th Cir. 1987).
86. See, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 11; Model Code of Professional Responsibility DR 7-
102(A)(2) (1980); Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 3.1 (1983).
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accomplishing the goal at the heart of the Acts: the prevention of
discrimination in the work place.8 7 In addressing this goal the
courts should settle on a test which is capable of discerning the
relevant economic realities of the work relationship and recogniz-
ing when the opportunity for discrimination exists. Indeed, one
court has explicitly stated that the Acts' coverage should apply to
"the full range of workers who may be subject to the harms the
statute was designed to prevent, unless such workers are excluded
by a specific statutory exception."8 8 The Wheeler court's blanket
denial of protection to partners would allow partnerships to evade
a 1983 decision of the United States Supreme Court. Hishon v.
King & Spalding89 held that associates in a partnership were pro-
tected from discrimination when being considered for advance-
ment to partner status.90 Under Wheeler's rigid and mechanical
analysis, a firm would be able to dismiss associates for discrimina-
tory reasons by simply advancing them to partner and then firing
them without worrying about discrimination suits.
The flexible application of the economic realities test by the
Caruso court is the appropriate method for prevention of discrimi-
nation against partners. Caruso requires a case by case analysis
and prevents partnerships from hiding discriminatory practices be-
hind the label of "partner." The Wheeler court's fear that such an
approach would burden every partnership with proving that the
realities demonstrate the presence of a bona fide partnership is un-
warranted. These firms have gained the many benefits of partner-
ship form, however, freedom to discriminate against partners is
not one these benefits. Whatever the designation of the organiza-
tional structure of a business, if a worker is in a position of such
dependency that he or she is exposed to discrimination, then that
person should receive the protections of the Antidiscrimination
Acts.
87. Dowd, supra note 27, at 75-77. The important question for Dowd is
"whether the worker actually or potentially stands in a relationship in which the
employer's control over employment opportunties permits the erection of artificial,
unnecessary barriers to those opportunities based on the worker's race, sex, na-
tional origin, or religion." Id. at 86.
88. Armbruster v. Quinn, 711 F.2d 1332, 1339 (6th Cir. 1983).
89. 467 U.S. 69 (1983).
90. Id. at 78.
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